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IS LIMITED TO RECOVERY
OF REASONABLE VALUE OF
SERVICES
Plaza Shoe Store v. Hermel Inc. 1
When an attorney is discharged without cause under a contingent fee
contract, the traditional rule has allowed the attorney to recover the
amount due to him under the contract, or recover the reasonable value of
his services.2 Missouri courts followed the contract rule3 until the Missouri
Supreme Court's decision in Plaza Shoe Store v. Hermel, Inc.4 In Plaza Shoe,
the supreme court adopted the modern rule, which limits the attorney's
recovery to the reasonable value of his services.5 The decision reflects the
changing attitude of the courts regarding attorney-client law; it should have
major effects on what has been considered a contractual relationship.6 Be-
cause clients will no longer be required to pay their original attorneys re-
gardless of the litigation's outcome, Plaza Shoe should encourage the free
exercise of the client's absolute right to discharge the attorney.7 The deci-
sion may, however, affect the desirability and negotiation of contingent fee
contracts.
Plaza Shoe Store filed suit against Hermel, Inc. alleging negligent de-
sign and construction of a building that Plaza Shoe leased.' Plaza Shoe
retained the law firm of Greene, Cassity, Carnahan, Freemont & Greene to
pursue the claim under a one-third contingent fee contract.9 Although the
matter was over three years old and had minimum settlement value, Plaza
Shoe received four settlement offers.1° When the law firm recommended
1. 636 S.W.2d 53 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
2. See notes 19-20 and accompanying text infra.
3. Id
4. 636 S.W.2d 53 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
5. I.R at 60.
6. See 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 118 (1980).
7. See notes 24-29 and accompanying text infra.
8. 636 S.W.2d at 53-54.
9. Id at 54.
10. Id When the Greene firm took over the case, the named plaintiff was not
the occupant or the tenant, nor had it sustained any damages. The statute of limi-
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that Plaza Shoe accept the last offer of $50,000 plus a potential rent reduc-
tion, Plaza Shoe accused the attorneys of being crooks and of selling out to
the defendants." The firm concluded it could no longer represent Plaza
Shoe, terminated the fee contract, and filed notice of its attorney's lien. 2
The case was settled and the court placed the proceeds in escrow.13
The law firm billed Plaza Shoe for $16,470 plus costs, and requested that
the trial court pay the firm out of the settlement proceeds, either for the
contract amount or in quantum meruit.14 The court granted relief on the
contract and valued the firm's services at $14,417.50.15 Plaza Shoe ap-
tations on the proper party was about to lapse, and the defendants were aware the
proper party was not named. Id
11. Id at 55.
12. Plaza Shoe's accusations created a constructive discharge which entitled
the law firm to terminate the employment contract. See Mo. SuP. CT. R. 4, EC 2-
32 (lawyer should withdraw only under compelling circumstances); id DR 2-
11 0(c)(1)(d) (withdrawal permitted when client's conduct renders effective repre-
sentation impossible); see generally 1 S. SPEISER, ArORNEys' FEES § 4:12 (1973)
(circumstances which justify abandonment). Whether withdrawal is justified is a
question of fact. See Young v. Lanznar, 133 Mo. App. 130, 138, 112 S.W. 17, 20
(1908).
A withdrawing attorney may place a lien on settlement proceeds by serving the
opposing party with notice of the contingent fee agreement. See Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 484.140 (1978). A collateral issue in Plaza Shoe was whether filing a motion in the
original proceedings was the proper procedure for enforcing the attorney's lien.
Plaza Shoe contended that a discharged attorney could enforce the lien only
through an independent proceeding against the client. 636 S.W.2d at 56. This
contention was based on a narrow interpretation of Nelson v. Massman Constr. Co.,
120 S.W.2d 77, 89 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938), modifedon other grounds sub nom., State ex rel.
Massman Constr. Co. v. Shain, 344 Mo. 1103, 130 S.W.2d 491 (1939), and Sat-
terfield v. Southern Ry., 287 S.W.2d 395 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956). These cases indi-
cated that an attorney could enforce the lien against the judgment, either through
an independent action or by motion in the original case, or against the client in an
independent proceeding. Satterfield, 287 S.W.2d at 397; Nelson, 120 S.W.2d at 89.
Although Mo. REV. STAT. § 484.130 (1978) does not expressly provide a remedy for
enforcing the lien, courts have not restricted attorneys to any particular relief. See
Satterfield, 287 S.W.2d at 397. In Plaza Shoe, the supreme court concluded that the
trial court had jurisdiction to enforce the lien, for trial courts have broad discretion
to determine the appropriate enforcement methods and because there is no signifi-
cant difference between proceeding directly against the client and proceeding
against funds held in escrow by the court. 636 S.W.2d at 56.
13. The settlement was for $58,000. 636 S.W.2d at 54. The party paying a
settlement subject to an attorney's lien may give the proceeds to the court for distri-
bution. See Lawson v. Missouri & Kan. Tel. Co., 178 Mo. App. 124, 136, 164 S.W.
138, 143 (1914).
14. This figure was apparently based on a $50,000 settlement. The firm unsuc-
cessfully attempted to increase the amount to $16,666. 636 S.W.2d at 55.
15. There is authority that a court cannot give alternate relief in quantum me-
ruit if the attorney does not request it. See Craig v. Jo B. Gardner, Inc., 586 S.W.2d
1983] 1051
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pealed the order, and the case was transferred from the Missouri Court of
Appeals for the Southern District to the Missouri Supreme Court.16 The
supreme court held that attorneys employed under contingent fee contracts
who are discharged without cause before settlement or judgment are enti-
tled only to the reasonable value of the legal services rendered.' 7 The court
also held that recovery is allowed only when the contingency occurs, and
that the amount recovered may not exceed the contract fee."a
Missouri previously had applied the contract rule, which allows an at-
torney discharged without cause to recover on the contingent fee contract
or in quantum meruit."9 Because this rule treats the attorney-client agree-
316, 325 (Mo. 1979) (en bane). Choice of the wrong lien enforcement remedy may
prevent recovery. See Schechter v. Fitzsimmons Indus., 627 S.W.2d 89, 91 (Mo, Ct.
App. 1981) (order that husband pay wife's attorney's fees was not direct award of
fees to attorney, so garnishment was improper remedy).
16. 636 S.W.2d at 55.
17. Id at 60.
18. Id
19. Id at 55-56. See Craig v. Jo B. Gardner, Inc., 586 S.W.2d 316, 325 (Mo.
1979) (en banc); In re Downs, 363 S.W.2d 679, 686 (Mo. 1963); In re Thomasson's
Estate, 346 Mo. 911, 916, 144 S.W.2d 79, 83 (1940); Mills v. Metropolitan St. Ry.,
282 Mo. 118, 122, 221 S.W. 1, 4 (1920); Barthels v. Garrels, 206 Mo. App. 199, 201,
227 S.W. 910, 914 (1920). Enforcement of an attorney's lien is an equitable action.
Craig v. Jo B. Gardner, Inc., 586 S.W.2d 316, 325 (Mo. 1979) (en bane); Fein v.
Schwartz, 404 S.W.2d 210, 228 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966).
Most jurisdictions allow the attorney wrongfully discharged to recover the con-
tract price. See Kaushiva v. Hutter, 454 A.2d 1373, 1374 (D.C. 1983); Carter v.
Dunham, 104 Kan. 59, 63, 177 P. 533, 535 (1919); Walters v. Hastings, 84 N.M.
101, 107, 500 P.2d 186, 192 (1972); Roberts v. Montgomery, 115 Ohio St. 502, 507,
154 N.E. 740, 741 (1926); White v. American Law Book Co., 106 Okla. 166, 167,
233 P. 426, 427 (1924); Dolph v. Speckart, 94 Or. 555, 565, 186 P. 32, 35 (1920);
Kent v. Fishblate, 247 Pa. 361, 364-65, 93 A. 509, 510 (1915); Mandrell & Wright v.
Thomas, 441 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex. 1969). The modern rule, adopted by several
jurisdictions, limits recovery to the reasonable value of services. See Friedman v.
Harris, 158 F.2d 187, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Ownes v. Bolt, 218 Ala. 344, 350, 118
So. 590, 594 (1928); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Saint Joseph's Hosp., 107 Ariz.
498, 502, 489 P.2d 837, 841 (1971); Fracasse v. Brent, 6 Cal. 3d 784, 791, 494 P.2d 9,
13, 100 Cal. Rptr. 385, 391 (1972); Cole v. Myers, 128 Conn. 223, 229, 21 A.2d 396,
399 (1941); Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016, 1022 (Fla. 1982); Dorsey v. Edge,
75 Ga. App. 388, 392, 43 S.E.2d 425, 428 (1947); French v. Cunningham, 149 Ind.
632, 635, 49 N.E. 797, 799 (1898); Breathitt Coal, Iron & Lumber Co. v. Gregory,
25 Ky. 1507, 1509, 78 S.W. 148, 149 (1904); Salem Realty Co. v. Matera, 10 Mass.
App. Ct. 571, -, 410 N.E.2d 716, 719 (1980); Ambrose v. Detroit Edison Co., 65
Mich. App. 484, 488, 237 N.W.2d 520, 522 (1975); Pye v. Diebold, 204 Minn. 319,
322, 283 N.W.2d 487, 488 (1939); Baker v. Zikas, 176 Neb. 290, 293, 125 N.W.2d
715, 717 (1964); In re Estate of Poli, 134 N.J. Super. 222, 225, 338 A.2d 888, 891
(1975); Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 170, 176, 114 N.E. 46, 48 (1916); Covington v.
Rhodes, 38 N.C. App. 61, 64, 247 S.E.2d 305, 308 (1978), cert. denied, 296 N.C. 410,
251 S.E.2d 468 (1979); Heinzmann v. Fine, Fine, Legum & Fine, 217 Va. 958, 963,
1052 [Vol. 48
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ment like any other employment contract,20 the supreme court reexamined
it in light of the attorney-client relationship. The court felt that reevalua-
tion of the rule was justified by the current increase in litigation, the growth
in use of contingent fee contracts, and the need to maintain public confi-
dence in courts and attorneys. 2  The court characterized the attorney-cli-
ent relationship as delicate, highly personal, and built on special trust and
confidence.2 2 Clients totally rely on their attorneys, so they must have com-
plete confidence in their ability and integrity, and the relationship requires
absolute fairness and candor.
23
The court in Plaza Shoe reasoned that because of the unique aspects of
the relationship, the client has the absolute right to discharge his attorney,
24
a right that is much greater than in other employment relationships. 25 The
modern rule is based on this special trust and confidence and the client's
right to discharge his attorney.26 The absolute right to discharge makes
234 S.E.2d 282, 284 (1977); Ramey v. Graves, 112 Wash. 88, 91, 191 P. 801, 802
(1920); Clayton v. Martin, 108 W. Va. 571, 575, 151 S.E. 855, 856 (1930); see also
Annot., 92 A.L.R.3d 690 (1979).
20. 636 S.W.2d at 56. The remedies for breach of contract are damages, spe-
cific performance, and restitution. See 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 1102 (1964).
21. 636 S.W.2d at 56-57. Between 1970 and 1980, the number of federal civil
cases increased 93.3%, from 87,321 to 168,789. THE LAWYER'S ALMANAC 1981-82,
at 534.
22. 636 S.W.2d at 57. See also Craig v. Jo B. Gardner, Inc., 586 S.W.2d at 320
(client became dissatisfied when attorneys ignored his concerns over an important
petition error); Gardine v. Cottey, 360 Mo. 681, 695, 230 S.W.2d 731, 739 (1950)
(en banc) (attorney induced client's wife to forego valuable property settlement
rights in return for an uncontested divorce, then represented wife in divorce
proceeding).
23. 636 S.W.2d at 57 (citing Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016, 1021 (Fla.
1982)). See also Laughlin v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank, 163 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Mo. 1942);
In re Thomasson's Estate, 346 Mo. 911, 918, 144 S.W.2d 79, 83 (1940); Bybee v.
S'Renco, 316 Mo. 517, 522, 291 S.W. 459, 461 (1926).
24. 636 S.W.2d at 58. Although prior Missouri decisions recognized the right
to discharge, it was not characterized as absolute. See Allen v. Fewel, 337 Mo. 955,
961, 87 S.W.2d 142, 145 (1935); McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 427 S.W.2d 767, 768
(Mo. Ct. App. 1968). The authority was subject to the attorney's right to payment.
Craig v. Jo B. Gardner, Inc., 586 S.W.2d 316, 320 (Mo. 1979) (en banc); In re
Downs, 363 S.W.2d 679, 686 (Mo. 1963) (en banc).
25. 636 S.W.2d at 57 (citing Rosenberg, 409 So. 2d at 1021).
26. Id (citing Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 170, 114 N.E. 46 (1916)). See Fracasse
v. Brent, 6 Cal. 3d at 791, 494 P.2d at 13, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 389. This premise
underlies many recent decisions adopting the modern rule. See Note, Attorney-Client-
Contingent Fee Contracts-An Attorney Discharged Without Cause Under a Contingent Fee
Contract is Limited to Quantum Meruit Recover, and Recovery is Dependent Upon the Client's
Ultimate Recovery in the Underlying Action, 41 CIN. L. REv. 1002, 1003 (1972); Note,
Attorney-Client-Attores Right to Compensation When Discharged Without Cause From a
1983] 1053
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recovery of the contract fee suspect; to allow a client to discharge the attor-
ney and then hold the client liable in damages is unjust.2 7 The court was
persuaded that the modern rule was in the best interests of clients and the
legal profession because it balances the client's power to discharge against
the attorney's right to fair compensation.28 The modern rule is especially
desirable in contingent fee contracts because allowing recovery on the con-
tract may chill the client's discretion to discharge his attorney; economics
could force the client to continue with an attorney in whom he has lost
confidence.
29
After deciding that the discharged attorney's recovery is limited to the
reasonable value of services, the court addressed the issue of when the attor-
ney's cause of action accrued. The court looked at two approaches.30 The
New York view reasons that the cause of action accrues upon termination,
because the case has been removed from the discharged attorney, whose
compensation will rest on the ability of his successor.3 California courts
hold that the cause of action accrues when the contingency occurs, 32 be-
cause a reasonable fee can be calculated only when the ultimate recovery is
determined. 33 Although the attorney may have an established hourly
charge, the benefit the client receives from the legal services is not measura-
ble until judgment or settlement.34 California courts find that it is im-
proper to burden the client with an obligation to pay a discharged attorney
Contingent Fee Contract-Covington v. Rhodes, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 677, 689-
90 (1979).
27. 636 S.W.2d at 58.
28. If the client is liable to the discharged attorney for the contract price and
must also pay substitute counsel, recovery may be substantially depleted by attor-
neys' fees. See Note, Limiting the Wrongly Discharged Attorney's Recoveoy to Quantum
Memit-Fracasse v. Brent, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 771, 783 (1973); see, e.g., Jones v.
Brown, 84 Cal. App. 2d 390, 190 P.2d 956 (1948) (over 73% of recovery paid to
attorneys). Plaza Shoe eventually paid $34,290.35 in attorneys' fees and expenses
out of a $58,000 recovery (59%), despite the limits of the modern rule. 636 S.W.2d
at 60.
29. 636 S.W.2d at 58. See also Salopek v. Schoemann, 20 Cal. 2d 150, 124 P.2d
21 (1942) (Gibson, C.J., concurring) (client forced to choose between double contin-
gent fees or a single attorney in whom he has no confidence).
30. 636 S.W.2d at 59.
31. Tillman v. Komar, 259 N.Y. 133, 135-36, 181 N.E. 75, 76 (1932); Martin v.
Camp, 219 N.Y. at 177, 114 N.E. at 49. See also Fracasse v. Brent, 6 Cal. 3d at 804,
494 P.2d at 23, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 398 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
32. Fracasse, 6 Cal. 3d at 791-92, 494 P.2d at 13-14, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 389-90.
33. Id at 792, 494 P.2d at 14, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 390. This logic is not persua-
sive because the court could determine the right to a fee on discharge and postpone
its calculation until the client recovers. See WAKE FOREST L. REV., supra note 26,
at 685.
34. A significant factor in determining whether an attorney's fee is reasonable
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regardless of the outcome of the litigation;35 any other result would inhibit
the exercise of the client's absolute right to discharge. 6 Although it is in-
consistent with contract law,3 7 the Missouri Supreme Court adopted the
California view because of the policies it serves38 and the unique nature of
the attorney-client relationship.
39
The court also determined that the contract price should limit any
quantum meruit recovery.' According to the New York view, discharge
cancels the contract, 4 ' and the attorney may recover in quantum meruit an
amount which may exceed the contract price.42 This is consistent with
traditional contract law.4 3 The Missouri Supreme Court, however; stressed
that in attorney-client relations, policy outweighed traditional contract the-
ory; allowing "unlimited recovery under quantum meruit loses sight of the
rationale of the modem rule favoring a client's freedom to discharge his
attorney without unreasonable burden."" If the contract price limits re-
covery, the client is not forced to pay a penalty for exercising the right to
discharge.
45
35. Fracasse, 6 Cal. 3d at 792, 494 P.2d at 14, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 390. This is
particularly true for poor clients.
36. Id at 790-91, 494 P.2d at 13, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 389. See also Rosenberg v.
Levin, 409 So. 2d, 1016, 1021 (Fla. 1982); 601 Lincoln Rd., Inc. v. Kelner, 289 So.
2d 12, 15 (Fla. Ct. App. 1974).
37. "[O]ne who disaffirms a contract may not selectively enforce its provi-
sions." 636 S.W.2d at 59. See also Tillman v. Komar, 259 N.Y. at 135, 181 N.E. at
75 (attorney recovered in excess of contingent fee contract amount). But see J.
CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 511-26 (2d ed. 1977) (default-
ing party may not recover on the contract unless performance is substantial, divisi-
ble, or independent of the promise); 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 20, § 1123 (defaulting
party may recover the value of his performance less the aggrieved party's damages).
38. The California rule preserves the client's absolute right to discharge,
reduces the cost of exercising that right, and promotes public confidence in the legal
system. 636 S.W.2d at 59-60.
39. Id
40. Id at 59.
41. Tillman v. Komar, 259 N.Y. at 135, 181 N.E. at 75.
42. 636 S.W.2d at 59. Quantum meruit recovery could exceed the contract
price if the original contingent fee was low and the case was lengthy or difficult.
43. In contract law, the majority rule does not restrict damages to the contract
amount, although the contract price is evidence of the value of performance. 5 A.
CORBIN, supra note 20, § 1113.
44. 636 S.W.2d at 59.
45. Id at 59-60 (citing Chamblis, Bahner & Crawford v. Luther, 531 S.W.2d
108, 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975)). In Plaza Shoe, the court reasoned that since the
discharged attorney may recover only after the contingency occurs, the trial court is
the proper forum for enforcement of the lien. The method of enforcement and the
valuing of services fall within the trial court's discretion. 636 S.W.2d at 60. The
court stated that trial judges may determine reasonable value in accordance with
DR 2-106(B), which provides:
1983] 1055
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The contract rule permits the discharged attorney to recover the
agreed percentage of the ultimate recovery.4 6 Although this rule seems
harsh, several factors support it. Valuation of attorney's services is difficult,
particularly if the work is incomplete.4 7 It is hard to value fractions of work
on a case4 " because the attorney's learning and judgment give the product
its worth.49 The most important part of this work may be the initial ad-
vice.50 If agreed upon, a contract price may provide a measure of dam-
Factors to be considered as guides in determining the reasonableness of a
fee include the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal
service properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of
the particular employment will preclude other employment by
the lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
services.
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the
circumstances.
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client.
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
Mo. SuP. CT. R. 4, DR 2-106(B).
46. Prior to Plaza Shoe, Missouri courts applied the contract rule. See In re
Downs, 363 S.W.2d 679, 686 (Mo. 1963) (lawyer discharged without fault from
contingent fee contract may sue for contract fee when claim is liquidated by judg-
ment or settlement); Gillham v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 282 Mo. 118, 123, 221 S.W.
1, 5 (1920) (attorney discharged from contingent fee contract may sue on contract
or for reasonable value of services).
47. See Kikuchi v. Ritchie, 202 F. 857, 859 (9th Cir. 1913); Henry v. Vance, 111
Ky. 72, 82, 63 S.W. 273, 276 (1901); GIN. L. REv., supra note 26, at 1004.
48. See Note, supra note 28, at 781 (citing Brodie v. Watkins, 33 Ark. 545, 548
(1878)).
49. Terminal Ry. Ass'n v. Schmidt, 353 Mo. 79, 92, 182 S.W.2d 79, 84 (1944);
Wonneman v. Wonneman, 305 S.W.2d 71, 81 (Mo. App. 1957). See generalo I S.
SPEISER, supra note 12, § 8.8.
50. See Bradley v. Neal, 234 Ark. 728, 731, 354 S.W.2d 269, 270-71 (1962) (cit-
ing Brodie v. Watkins, 33 Ark. 545, 548 (1878)). Although the difficulty in allocat-
ing the value of legal services is cited in support of the contract rule, it may favor
quantum meruit recovery. See Note, supra note 28, at 781. Quantum meruit recov-
ery should account for all relevant factors, including the time and labor required,
the novelty and difficulty of the case, the ability and experience of counsel, and the
result. See, e.g., German Evangelical St. Marcus Congregation v. Archambault, 404
S.W.2d 705, 711 (Mo. 1966); Terminal Ry. Ass'n v. Schmidt, 353 Mo. 79, 92, 182
S.W.2d 79, 84 (1944). Moreover, quantum meruit is determined by judges, who are
1056 [Vol. 48
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ages.5 Charging the full fee prevents the client from benefitting from his
own breach.5 2 Moreover, under the contract rule, a discharged attorney
generally has no duty to mitigate damages by seeking substitute employ-
ment,5 3 as discharged employees generally do.54 The contract rule protects
the attorney's economic interest, 5 motivates attorneys to provide necessary
legal services, and improves access to legal services. 56 This protection, how-
ever, comes at the client's expense, and policy should not favor attorneys
over clients. Although there is support for the contract rule, the Missouri
Supreme Court found in Plaza Shoe that the modern rule better advances
the policy of allowing a client to discharge his attorney at any time, and
promotes greater confidence in the legal profession.
57
In Missouri, agency law governs the attorney-client relationship.
58
The "nature of the lawyer's profession necessitates the utmost good faith
toward his client and the highest loyalty and devotion to his client's inter-
ests.",59 However, the absolute right of the client to discharge his attorney
afforded by Plaza Shoe is inconsistent with agency law, under which a prin-
cipal has no right to revoke the agency merely because he has lost confi-
dence in the agent.6" The principal's right to discharge is subject to
payment of damages.6 1 Plaza Shoe, in contrast, places a greater value on
protecting the client/principal's need for confidence in his attorney/agent.
Several features of the attorney-client relationship justify favoring princi-
considered experts on attorneys' fees. Sebree v. Rosen, 393 S.W.2d 590, 599 (Mo.
1965).
51. See, e.g., McCall v. Atchley, 256 Mo. 39, 46, 164 S.W. 593, 595 (1914) (at-
torney has action at law upon discharge for one-fourth of property value as speci-
fied in contingent fee contract).
52. See, e.g., Dolph v. Speckart, 94 Or. 550, 566, 186 P. 32, 35-36 (1920). Be-
cause discharge prevents full performance by the attorney, it is impossible to meas-
ure damages under the general contract damages rule.
53. See Annot., 44 A.L.R.3d 629 (1972) (occupations required to mitigate dam-
ages). But see 11 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 679, 690 (1976) (attorney employed
by a law firm may be required to mitigate damages).
54. 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 20, § 1095. See, e.g., Wessler v. City of St. Louis,
242 S.W.2d 289, 290-91 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951).
55. Traditionally, a contract is enforceable to the extent of its value. Thus,
when a client breaches a contingent fee contract, the full price should be recovered,
although it may exceed the actual loss. 11 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS § 1315 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1968).
56. See Note, Breach of Contingent Fee Contract, 1960 Wis. L. REV. 156, 158.
57. 636 S.W.2d at 60.
58. Qualls v. Field Enter. Corp., 302 F. Supp. 152, 153 (E.D. Mo. 1969); South-
western Bell Tel. Co. v. Roussin, 534 S.W.2d 273, 276 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); State ex
rel. A.M.T. v. Weinstein, 411 S.W.2d 267, 272 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967); Schwarze v.
May Dep't Stores, 360 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962).
59. In re Thomasson's Estate, 346 Mo. 911, 918, 144 S.W.2d 79, 83 (1940).
60. See 9 S. WILLISTON, supra note 55, § 1012B.
61. See W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 48, at 87-88 (1964).
1983] 1057
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pals over agents: the client's inability to evaluate the quality of legal serv-
ices,6 2 the client's inability to foresee whether he will retain confidence in
the attorney selected, 63 and the impairment of effective legal representation
which may result if clients are compelled to continue relationships with at-
torneys in whom they have lost confidence.
64
Plaza Shoe may have a great impact on the availability of contingent
fee contracts, which have made some legal services available to those who
otherwise could not afford representation.6 5 Even clients who can afford to
pay attorneys by the hour may prefer contingent fee contracts because ex-
penses are minimized if the claim is lost.66 Although firmly established in
the United States,6 7 contingent fee contracts are controversial.68 It has
been suggested that they are a gamble on litigation and are inconsistent
with the detachment required in the legal profession.69 The emphasis on
winning may reduce the lawyer's self-restraint in negotiation and advo-
cacy.7 0 Large financial rewards may encourage solicitation, impairing the
professional disinterest necessary to effectively advising clients.7 1 In addi-
tion, the contingent fee can be excessive, unrelated in time, talent, or effort
to the value of the services.
72
62. See generalhi Mazor, Power and Responsibility in the Attorney-Client Relationshi,
20 STAN. L. REv. 1120, 1121 (1968); Note, supra note 56, at 158-59.
63. See, e.g., Phelps v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 70 Ill. App. 89, 94, 217 N.E.2d 519,
522 (1966). In Phelps, a client signed a contingent fee contract without reading the
fine print. After having the terms read to her, she attempted to discharge the attor-
neys, but they refused to accept the registered letter of discharge.
64. See Note, supra note 28, at 787.
65. See generally Lipscomb v. Adams, 193 Mo. 530, 542-43, 91 S.W. 1046, 1048
(1906); Mo. SuP. CT. R. 4, EC 2-20, EC 5-7; Youngwood, The Contingent Fee-A
Reasonable Alternative, 28 MOD. L. REv. 330, 333-34 (1965) (contingent fee contracts
serve persons who might otherwise go unrepresented).
66. Note, Contingent Fee: Champerty or Champion?, 21 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 15, 28
(1972). Relatively sophisticated consumers of large quantities of legal services,
armed with the knowledge that they will be liable upon discharge only for the rea-
sonable value of services, may acquire the leverage to demand lower-percentage
contingent fee contracts.
67. Youngwood, supra note 65, at 333. Civil contingent fees are used every-
where but Maine and Massachusetts. Outside of this country, the contingent fee is
considered champterous and prohibited. Id at 331. The Missouri Bar Advisory
Committee has formally declared that contingent fees are unethical in some domes-
tic relations cases, Missouri Bar Administration, 33 J. Mo. B. 465 (1977), and in all
criminal cases. Mo. SuP. CT. R. 4, DR 2-106(C).
68. See 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 12, § 2:3; Note, supra note 66, at 15-16; see gener-
all M. BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS 192-220 (1968); F. MACKINNON,
CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 4-6 (1964).
69. F. MACKINNON, supra note 68, at 4; Note, supra note 66, at 16.
70. F. MACKINNON, supra note 68, at 4.
71. Id
72. Suggested Changes in the Contingent Fee System, 19 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 76, 82
1058 [Vol. 48
9
Brown: Brown: Attorney Discharged without Cause
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1983
CONTINGENT FEE CONTRACTS
Under the modern rule, an attorney discharged without cause may re-
cover only the reasonable value of services rendered prior to discharge.
This has been criticized as imperiling the attorney's economic interest.7 3 A
primary justification for the modern rule is allowing a client the freedom to
change representation,74 thus promoting public confidence in the legal pro-
fession.7" Confidence may be undermined by a rule which forces clients to
retain attorneys in whom they have lost confidence.7 6 Attorneys are respon-
sible for administration of justice as officers of the court.7 7 Willingness to
consult an attorney depends in part on general confidence in the legal pro-
fession, 78 and the modern rule attempts to improve the administration of
justice by promoting public confidence.79 This is accomplished by judi-
cially implying terms in contingent fee contracts that give clients the abso-
lute right to discharge, with or without cause.
8 0
Plaza Shoe should cause Missouri attorneys to reassess contingent fee
contracts, which may no longer be economically appealing. At least two
(Winter 1968-69). Some have advocated judicial review of contingent fees in per-
sonal injury cases. While most clients accept the "no recovery-no fee" rule, they
often find fees unreasonably high. Committee on Personal Injury Claims, State Bar
of California, The Case for Contingent Fees, 6 LAw OFF. ECON. & MGMT., 189, 190
(1965). Two reasons are advanced to support the high percentage fee: first, it cov-
ers costs in cases where the attorney performs but obtains no recovery; second, cli-
ents get a bargain by not paying when they lose. Contingent fees are not
unreasonable when balanced against the costs in cases lost or complex cases, where
the fee does not fully compensate the attorney. F. MACKINNON, supra note 68, at
182.
73. WAKE FOREST L. REV., supra note 26, at 686-87. But see Covington v.
Rhodes, 38 N.C. App. 61, 66, 247 S.E.2d 305, 308 (1978) (modern rule will not
deter future use of contingent fees), cert. denied, 296 N.C. 410, 251 S.E.2d 468 (1979).
74. 636 S.W.2d at 58. This freedom is greater than that in the normal agency
relationship. Note, supra note 28, at 786-87.
75. 636 S.W.2d at 57. See Fracasse v. Brent, 6 Cal. 3d at 789, 494 P.2d at 12,
100 Cal. Rptr. at 388; Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. at 176, 114 N.E. at 48.
76. 636 S.W.2d at 58. See also Fracasse, 6 Cal. 3d at 789, 494 P.2d at 12, 100
Cal. Rptr. at 388. Increased public confidence would encourage people to seek le-
gal advice. Note, supra note 28, at 789.
77. Note, supra note 28 at 788-89. See also Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 520
(1966) (Fortas, J., concurring) (although an officer of the court, attorney cannot be
disbarred for asserting privilege against self-incrimination).
78. Note, supra note 28, at 788.
79. This assumes that more people will seek legal advice if they know they are
free to discharge attorneys in whom they lose confidence.
80. The Plaza Shoe court recognized the logic of this approach. 636 S.W.2d at
58. This right frees the client from liability for breach of contract and damages
because of discharge. Fracasse, 6 Cal. 3d at 790-91, 494 P.2d at 13, 100 Cal. Rptr. at
389. Thus, the attorney recovers in restitution, off the contract. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 452 (1958) (upon termination without authority, principal
is liable for value of the agent's services).
1983] 1059
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situations are fraught with risk and unfairness for the attorney. First, an
attorney discharged immediately before judgment or settlement may be de-
nied the contract bargain, despite nearly full performance. Second, an at-
torney may be discharged after working diligently and receive no
compensation if the successor attorney loses the case. 1 Therefore, attorneys
may insist on higher percentage contingent fees to compensate for the risk
of discharge without recovery.82 Moreover, if the attorney feels he may be
discharged, he may not vigorously pursue the client's claim.8 3 If the mod-
ern rule discourages attorneys from taking contingent fee cases, poor clients
may go unrepresented. 4
Plaza Shoe could also lead to higher retaining fees, since a discharged
attorney may be entitled to a retaining fee, even if it exceeds the reasonable
value of the services rendered. 5 This would further limit the availability of
legal services. Limiting recovery to quantum meruit may also encourage
third-party interference with attorney-client relationships. Although gener-
ally there is no cause of action against one who induces a party to exercise
an absolute right," contractual interference actions against third parties
have been sustained 7 under the contract 8 and modern rules.8 9
81. See Fracasse, 6 Cal. 3d at 804, 494 P.2d at 14, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 399 (Sulli-
van, J., dissenting) (attorney does not bargain for the risk that another will take the
case).
82. WAKE FOREST L. REV., supra note 26, at 687.
83. Note, supra note 28, at 793.
84. WAKE FOREST L. REV., supra note 26, at 687. Higher contingent fees will
mean fewer clients will be able to pay, increasing the burden on attorneys to pro-
vide free legal services. Cf Mo. Sup. CT. R. 4, EC 2-25 ("The rendition of free legal
services to those unable to pay reasonable fees continues to be an obligation of each
lawyer.").
85. A retaining fee is a preliminary payment to secure an attorney's future serv-
ices. A contract to pay a retainer is valid and enforceable even though the services
are never rendered. 7A C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 282 (1980). But cf. Rimos v.
Rimos, 81 N.Y.S.2d 347 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (retainer must be returned when attorney
is discharged for cause).
86. Seegenerally Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 1223, 1227 (1952). For example, an attor-
ney has no cause of action against a person who induces the client to settle. The
Missouri attorney's lien statute does not give the attorney the power to prevent
settlement. Taylor v. St. Louis Transit Co., 198 Mo. 715, 726, 97 S.W. 155, 157
(1906). Absent fraud or collusion, the client has the absolute right to settle or adjust
the claim. Gerritzen v. Louisville & Nashville Ry., 115 S.W.2d 44, 45 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1938).
87. The action is for intentional interference with contract performance. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979). Under the Plaza Shoe rationale,
the contract is terminable at will by the client and technically there is no breach.
This should be taken into account in determining the discharged attorney's dam-
ages. Id § 774A.
88. State Farm Ins. Co. v. Gregory, 184 F.2d 447, 452 (4th Cir. 1950) (insur-
ance company induced client to settle for less than policy value by representing that
[Vol. 481060
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Plaza Shoe does not foreclose the possibility of attorneys recovering
damages for wrongful discharge. Recovery on the contract should be al-
lowed when the attorney performs non-legal work,' because the policies
that support the modem rule are not compelling outside the attorney-client
relationship. 9' Fracasse v. Brent, 92 relied on in Plaza Shoe, suggests that cli-
ents are liable for breach of contract for bad faith discharges.93 Bad faith is
evident in discharges by clients who have not lost confidence in their attor-
ney's loyalty or ability.94 Moreover, once the attorney has fully performed,
recovery should not be limited to quantum meruit,95 because the attorney's
right to the contract price is vested, and the client's attempted termination
should be ineffective. 96 Since an attorney has no implied authority to com-
promise or settle claims, it may be difficult to determine whether an attor-
ney has fully performed.97
Missouri attorneys should consider Plaza Shoe before drafting contin-
gent fee contracts. Because the supreme court did not prescribe a method
for calculating the reasonable value of services,9 8 contracts should be
drafted carefully to avoid problems. A contract should inform the client of
the absolute right to discharge, advise the client of his duty to compensate
the attorney for services rendered, and provide a method for calculating a
reasonable fee.99 The attorney should anticipate the possibility of discharge
settlement was more favorable than proceeding and dividing recovery with attor-
ney); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 107 Ariz. 498, 489 P.2d 837
(1971) (insurance company persuaded client to discharge attorney, helped her pre-
pare dismissal letter, then secured settlement for an amount previously rejected).
89. Lurie v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 270 N.Y. 379, 382, 1 N.E.2d 472,
473 (1936) (insurance agents threatened that unless client repudiated his retainer
with attorney, client would not recover).
90. See, e.g., Mandel v. Liebman, 303 N.Y. 88, 97, 100 N.E.2d 149, 154 (1951)
(attorney employed as personal representative and manager).
91. The use of legal skills does not conclusively create an attorney-client rela-
tionship. Id
92. 6 Cal. 3d 784, 494 P.2d 9, 100 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972).
93. Id. at 790, 494 P.2d at 13, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 387 ("It should be sufficient
that the client has, for whatever reason, lost faith in the attorney, to establish 'cause'
for discharging him.").
94. Note, supra note 28, at 790-91. See, e.g., Neeper v. Heinbach, 249 S.W. 440,
441 (Mo. Ct. App. 1923) (client engaged substitute counsel without notice to origi-
nal attorney and thus prevented performance).
95. To "the extent that such discharge occurs 'on the courthouse steps' where
the client executes a settlement obtained after much work by the attorney," reason-
able value of the attorney's services may equal the contingent fee. Fracasse, 6 Cal.
3d at 791, 494 P.2d at 14, 100 Cal. Rptr at 386.
96. Note, supra note 28, at 791.
97. Leffler v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 612 S.W.2d 835, 836 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
98. 636 S.W.2d at 60.
99. WAKE FOREST L. REV., supra note 26, at 688. The last provision should
encourage healthy discussion of fees. Accord Mo. SuP. CT. R. 4, EC 2-19 (clear
1983)
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immediately before settlement. 100 Reasonable fee provisions, admissible in
New York for determining reasonable value,' 0 1 could prevent litigation
over fees owed by former clients to their discharged attorneys.102
Plaza Shoe brings Missouri into the growing minority of states which
hold that an attorney discharged before judgment or settlement is limited to
recovering the reasonable value of services rendered. This limitation, while
inconsistent with contract and agency law, allows clients to discharge their
attorneys at any time. The modern rule does not unfairly penalize the cli-
ent for discharging an attorney in whom he has lost confidence. Plaza Shoe
should bolster public confidence in the legal profession.
FRANK C. BROWN
agreement with client as to the basis of the fee promotes understanding and good
relations; reasons for fee should be fully explained).
100. Under the modern rule, such a discharge could limit the attorney's fee.
Thus, the attorney would lose the contingent fee benefit of spreading costs of cases
lost over a large number of clients, possibly reducing willingness to accept contin-
gent fee contracts. An attorney discharged immediately before settlement may,
however, be entitled to the full contingent fee. See Fracasse 6 Cal. 3d at 791, 494
P.2d at 13-14, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 389-90; Covington v. Rhodes, 38 N.C. App. at 66,
247 S.E.2d at 309.
101. See Tillman v. Komar, 259 N.Y. at 135, 181 N.E. at 75-76; see also Potts v.
Mitchell, 410 F. Supp. 1278, 1282 (W.D.N.C. 1976); Gordon v. Stewart, 74 Nev.
115, 119, 324 P.2d 234, 236 (1958).
102. Suits against clients to recover fees are discouraged. See Mo. SUP. CT. R. 4,
EC 2-23; Note, supra note 28, at 787.
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